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Defending Whose Democracy? 
Media Freedom and Media Power
Natalie Fenton
Rarely has the relationship between media and democracy been so centre-stage. Whether 
regarding regulatory reform brought about by phone hacking in the UK, concentration 
of media ownership in Italy, Hungary, Australia to mention but a few; or in relation to 
social media and the internet as a supposed means to increased access to information 
and citizen production and circulation of non-mainstream content leading to greater so 
called media freedom. The debate on whether or not and in what form the media are 
related to the nature and practice of democracy is raging; and rightly so. 
Yet too often this debate, usually cast in populist terms, belies complexity. We are 
frequently told that one leads to the other. In one formulation, ‘free’ media are seen as a 
pre-requisite for democracy to flourish. Here we see an ill used interpretation of the con-
cept of ‘freedom of the press’ used to defy explanation and justify most anything ‒ who 
can be against freedom, particularly press freedom when the press have such a crucial 
relationship with a healthy democracy? Such a knee-jerk response is frequently no more 
than a cheap disguise for the promotion of free-market capitalism which is then seen 
as a direct path to enhanced democratisation on the gravy train of commercial media. 
Alternatively, it is proposed that ‘freedom’, as a free floating concept more generally 
connected in this instance to democracy (or more accurately, usually Western forms of 
capitalist democracy) will inevitably lead to a free media. But once more, dig a little 
deeper and this free media is largely construed as a media free at the point of profit. Both 
approaches present varying degrees of media determinism that forge a type of logic that 
then lends support to arguments for the inherent liberating and democratising impact 
of new media forms, such as the internet, regardless of actual content or the broader 
context of which they a part. Media Freedom in other words finds itself morphed from 
a complex concept into a simplistic notion that has assumed a level of normativity and 
developed a common-sense relationship to liberal democracy. To have one must be to 
have the other thereby denying a more critical analytical interpretation of its contem-
porary neo-liberal translation. 
What such approaches all too often fail to point out is that the relationship between 
media and democracy also depends on the existing state of the media and of the market 
and indeed on the state of actually existing democracy in each individual context – where 
context is likely to be state-led because of the prevailing dominance of state legislatures 
but not state-bound due to globalisation. Thus, this relationship also depends on politi-
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cal culture and media policy; the nature of the economy and the market; media and 
communication technologies and formats as well as social and cultural issues such as 
literacy, poverty, religious differences and daily rituals (Curran, Fenton and Freedman 
2012). This combination of factors all impinge, sometimes directly, on the relationship 
between media and democracy as each of these factors have an effect on media circu-
lation and on media consumption and influence how and to what extent democracies 
can function effectively – yet are all too frequently side stepped leaving us analytically 
moribund and politically stagnant.
In these sets of complex relations, news media are given a particular relevance with 
regards to citizen participation in political life. News provides, or should provide, the 
vital resources for processes of information gathering, deliberation and analysis that 
enables democracy to function. In an ideal world, unfettered by commercial pressures 
of failed business models, new technology and plummeting sales and circulation figures, 
this would mean that news media would survey the socio-political environment, hold 
the Government and other officials to account, provide a platform for intelligible and 
illuminating debate, and encourage dialogue across a range of views. This is an ideal 
relationship, however, and it’s hinged on a conception of independent journalism in the 
public interest linked to notions of knowledge, political participation and democratic 
renewal. But news media have been beset with many challenges over the last decade that 
have introduced considerable stress-lines to these ideals. A huge growth in the number 
of news outlets including the advent of and rapid increase in free papers, the emergence 
of 24 hour television news and the popularization of online and mobile platforms, has 
meant that more news must be produced and distributed at a faster rate than ever before. 
In a corporate news world it is now difficult to maintain profit margins and shareholder 
returns unless you employ fewer journalists (Fenton 2010). But fewer journalists with 
more space to fill means doing more work in less time often leading to a greater use of 
unattributed rewrites of press agency or public relations material and the cut and paste 
practice now known as churnalism (Davies 2008; Lee-Wright, Phillips and Witschge 
2011).
If you combine the faster and shallower corporate journalism of the digital age with 
the need to pull in readers for commercial rather than journalistic reasons it is not dif-
ficult to see how the traditional values of professional journalism are quickly cast aside 
in order to indulge in sensationalism and deal in gratuitous spectacles and dubious 
emotionalism. Set this alongside the fact that in many places, such as the UK, there are 
an ever-smaller number of global media institutions dominating the media landscape; 
then, the simple notion that more media means better democracy starts to look rather 
tenuous (Media Reform Coalition 2011).
The larger and more concentrated media empires become, the more concerned politi-
cians are to maintain good relations with owners and senior executives and editors (Da-
vis 2002). Political Parties, the police and other institutions are reluctant to investigate 
wrong-doing in the news media, hinder the expansion of large media conglomerates or 
introduce new regulation of news organizations and journalistic practice. Such patterns 
and relations have resulted in certain public policy areas being avoided for fear of either 
hostile reporting or media owner conflict. And, for the same reasons, politicians are 
more likely to discuss populist policies. As such, a media system that may have many 
platforms and points of distribution but is dominated by a few, powerful voices and a 
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news media increasingly run to secure financial reward or political influence is unlikely 
to foster greater participation in political culture. 
Theories of democratic political participation have long since recognized the roles the 
media play in activating political citizenship and participation. Media coverage plays a 
significant role in creating awareness and engagement. News matters at a fundamental 
level to society. But a simple abundance of news, one that just assumes that the more 
news we have the more democratic our societies are, speaks to a naïve pluralism that 
has been shown to be blatantly false. More news does not necessarily help democracy, 
even if consumption is high, if the nature of news content serves the interests of the news 
industry over and above the public’s information needs. In such cases contemporary 
coverage can actually lead to a mood of anti-politics, thwart political participation in 
the public sphere and diminish democracy (Coleman 2012).
Partly because the relationship between democracy and media is so complex and 
contingent it is also never fixed and constantly open to contestation – although the terms 
and extent of that contestation may be constrained under particular circumstances. The 
media, as democracies, are not homogenous, static entities. Both are ever changing, 
both contain power and shape the space where power is competed for, albeit in differ-
ent ways. As a consequence, both also contain difference and division as well as being 
subject to social forces and indeed social movements that may challenge established 
and vested interests (Freedman and Fenton 2013). When this happens and it most often 
happens at the point of crisis – whether due to the failings of democratic systems or 
the dismal behaviour of some parts of the media – it is then that the opportunity arises 
to rethink the relationship between media and democracy. We are at this point now in 
the UK and it is a battle that is being hard fought but one that is severely unbalanced 
in relation to media power. The tabloid press in particular, have thrown their might, 
money and megaphone behind a campaign designed to claim freedom as their right to 
publish whatever they like in the pursuit of profit; a response that equates markets to 
freedom and increased regulation to creeping authoritarianism.1 The discursive binary of 
freedom or authoritarianism is of course, a fake dichotomy that quickly falls apart once 
the notion of power is injected into the debate. Most people may be able to speak in this 
public sphere but we can not all speak at the same volume or be heard in the same way. 
So-called freedom is never unfettered or unstructured. It is always worth asking who or 
what in this unregulated nirvana has power? Certainly not your average person in the 
street or even your average journalist, but rather those corporate entities that ever more 
dominate the media landscape. Once power is taken into consideration then a critique of 
freedom takes on a rather different mantle from the crude assumption that we all begin 
from a level playing field and everyone approaches access to freedom from the same 
vantage point. These issues are exemplified in the recent hacking scandal in the UK.
The Case of the UK: Marketisation and Deregulation of the Press
In the summer of 2012 the News Of the World, owned by Rupert Murdoch, stood ac-
cused of illegal, unethical behaviour through the systematic phone hacking of politi-
cians, members of the royal family, celebrities and murder victims and their families. 
Murdoch subsequently closed down the News of the World and several ex-editors and 
journalists found themselves under criminal investigation. The Prime Minister, David 
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Cameron, publicly embarrassed by his employment of Andy Coulson (a former Edi-
tor of News of the World: 2003-2007), as his Director of Communications, who was 
arrested by the Metropolitan Police Service in July 2011 for allegations of corruption 
and phone hacking, then called for an inquiry chaired by Lord Justice Leveson to 
investigate the issue. 
Hackgate, as it became known, reveals the mechanisms of a system based on the 
corruption of power. It is not a distortion of a functional system, it is part and parcel 
of a system that is fully integrated into neo-liberalism. Phone hacking did not happen 
just because those who did it knew they could get away with it and editors thought on 
balance it was a business risk worth taking (in other words, that any subsequent pay-
outs to victims would be easily offset against increases in sales). Indeed, many editors 
denied that they had any knowledge of illegal practice occurring. The problem is much 
broader and deeper than any slippage in ethical practice would seem to suggest and rests 
not with the individual journalists but with the system of news production they were 
part of. The reasons phone hacking took place are complex and involve the increasing 
entanglement of political and media elites as news coverage has taken on an ever more 
important role in policy making and elections (Davis 2002); the failure of the Press 
Complaints Commission (the newspaper industry watchdog) to uphold ethical standards 
and enable adequate self-regulation of journalists (CCMR 2011; Couldry, Phillips and 
Freedman 2010); alongside the broken business model of newspapers with plummeting 
circulation and readership figures and the migration of classified advertising to online 
sites such as Craigslist in the US and Gumtree and eBay in the UK (Fenton 2010; Levy 
and Nielsen 2010). But one thing is clear – the illegal practice of phone hacking did not 
have the primary motive of the press as fourth estate holding truth to power. Rather, in 
a thoroughly marketised and deregulated newspaper industry the mission was to gain 
competitive advantage and increase newspaper sales. 
The practice of phone hacking has been widely condemned. However, a common 
response from the news industry itself has been to direct responsibility for phone hack-
ing towards the law and inadequate policing, claiming that it was not the concern of 
the media industry but rather a result of failures in criminal investigations and prosecu-
tions. The solution must lie therefore with the police and the enactment of the law and 
not through further regulation of the profession or industry which should remain ‘free’ 
to do effectively, as it pleases. ‘Freedom’ in this sense becomes a narrative device to 
sidestep the deeper, systemic problems of the newspaper industry of which these ethical 
misdemeanours are but one symptom. Freedom of the press stands in for all activities 
of the press regardless of whether they have democratic intent or not. 
As soon as the value of news to society is invoked, the contribution of news to the 
public sphere and consequently its relationship to a healthy democracy follows suit. In 
this manner, the relationship between journalism and democracy is understood as causal. 
Once we accept this inevitable sequential relationship it is easy to slip into commonsense 
assumptions: the more news we have the more democratic our societies are; the less 
news we have the less democratic we are. Abundance comes to stand in for pluralism 
and for freedom in the same breath. Of course, democracy is far more than the quantity 
of news and many so-called developed democracies have a plethora of news media but 
a public sphere that is severely impoverished (Aalberg, Aelst and Curran 2010). But 
this kind of short-cut libertarian defence that in fact aligns freedom with established 
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and vested power interests’ ability to do whatever they like within the law means that 
any form of regulation that may encourage news organizations to behave in particular 
ways, is assumed to be detrimental to democracy and involvement of the state in any 
form whatsoever in relation to the press becomes nothing more than state censorship.2 
Such arguments, that we see echoed in the proposition that the internet because of its 
potential for information pluralism, must, by its very nature, deliver more democracy, 
reveal a particular ideological premise. This was made explicit in the comments by 
David Price QC, an expert on the law of defamation and privacy: 
There is something Orwellian about describing this as the ‘Media Freedom and 
Regulatory Standards Bill’, as if they compliment each other, when they are direct 
opposites….It makes the mistake of assuming more regulation will help us get to 
the truth more easily. We get to the truth by having ideas tested in the marketplace, 
not by further regulation or by the great and good deciding what is true or ethical. 
(David Price QC quoted in The Times, 7.1.13)3
So, the marketplace, dominated by publishers who promote a very particular definition 
of public problems will deliver this thing called a free press that will enable a healthier 
democracy. Price goes on to say that he is also concerned by the reference to the regula-
tor needing to ensure the dignity of the individual:
We have a proud tradition of ridicule and satire that has protected against abuse of 
power. A free press will inevitably be undignified but it is far safer than a sanitised 
one […..] The point remains […] that a free press and freedom of expression are 
indivisible rights that belong to all or none at all. Defending that principle does 
not mean endorsing everything or anything that the press does. But it does mean 
accepting the freedom of others to publish what you don’t want to read, whether 
your personal tastes deem it ‘ethical’ or not. Freedom is always a messy business. 
Nobody has to pass a test set by Lord Justice Leveson or Hacked Off to qualify 
for the right to free speech. (Ibid)
It is true that if we look to both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
European Convention on Human Rights they do proclaim a universal right to freedom 
of expression. The latter is more detailed and it is helpful to look more closely at it. In 
Article 10.i It states that
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include free-
dom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without 
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article shall not 
prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema 
enterprises. (ECHR 1950:11)
However, article 10.ii – far less often read or cited – qualifies Article 10.i by stating that:
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibili-
ties, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as 
are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests 
of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of 
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of 
the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information 
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received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the 
judiciary.(ECHR 1950:11)
As Baroness Onora O’Neil (2012) argues, the much quoted Article 10 when seen in its 
entirety, does not assume that freedom of expression is an unconditional right, or that 
it may not be restricted or subject to regulations. The Declaration proclaims a qualified 
right to freedom of expression, but leaves it to legislatures and to courts to determine 
which qualifications and restrictions are and are not needed and acceptable at a given 
time and place. Baroness O’Neill goes on to argue that an individuals’ right to freedom 
of expression cannot be transferred directly to the speech of powerful organizations 
stating that, “it is simply a mistake to see the speech of the powerful as self expression” 
(O’Neill 2012: 9). 
This mythology of naïve pluralism assumes that journalists already operate with full 
independence and in the interests of democracy; that news organisations have democratic 
intent at their core. But much (although by no means all) tabloid journalism runs counter 
to the public interest and has little democratic intent. As Trevor Kavannagh, Associate 
Editor of the Sun noted in his own evidence to Leveson:
…news is as saleable a commodity as any other. Newspapers are commercial, 
competitive businesses, not a public service. (6 October 2011): http://www.guard-
ian.co.uk/media/2011/oct/06/trevor-kavanagh-leveson-inquiry-speech.
News in these formulations is primarily for profit – this is a marketplace that operates 
on market principles. But of course, news is no ordinary commodity – it offers the pos-
sibility of directing the public conversation and hence is of relevance to politicians keen 
to convince voters of the benefits of their particular policy formulations. This puts news 
proprietors in a particular position of power. The owner of the London Evening Standard 
and the Independent, Russian billionaire Evgeny Lebedev tweeted after his appearance at 
Leveson: “Forgot to tell #Leveson that it’s unreasonable to expect individuals to spend 
£millions on newspapers and not have access to politicians”.
In the UK it would seem, there is a relationship of sorts between news and democracy 
but a largely dysfunctional one whose breaking points pivot on issues relating to the 
commercialism and marketisation of news as well as concentration of ownership and 
deregulation. The notion that somehow truth will emerge victorious in this so-called 
marketplace of ideas is clearly misconstrued and we would do well to remember that just 
as journalism can be democratising, so it can also be de-democratising (Fenton 2012). 
Hackgate reveals the mechanisms of a system based on the corruption of power and 
one that displays many of the hallmarks of neo-liberal practice. Rupert Murdoch and the 
news culture he helped to promote was part of this process in the UK that began with 
the defeat of the print unions at Wapping and continued with the lobby for extensive 
liberalisation of media ownership regulation to enable an unprecedented global media 
empire to emerge. And where did we end up? Hackgate enabled the naming and sham-
ing of what many had believed to be the case for years: systematic invasions of privacy 
that wrecked lives on a daily basis (Cathcart 2012); lies and deceit of senior newspaper 
figures; the wily entanglement and extensive associations of media and political elites 
(Coleman 2012) (during the Leveson inquiry it was revealed that a member of the Cabi-
net had met executives from Rupert Murdoch’s empire once every three days on aver-
age since the Coalition was formed);4 and a highly politicised and corrupt police force 
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(Rebekah Brookes, Chief Executive Officer of News International 2009-2011 and former 
Editor of News of the World and The Sun, admitted to paying police for information in 
a House of Commons Select Committee in 2003 but denied it in 2011 (BBC News UK, 
15 April 2011) and over a quarter of the police public affairs department were found to 
be previous employers of the News of the World (Warrell 2011)).This was certainly a 
media freedom of sorts but certainly not one that was defending democracy even in its 
most populist formulations.
Freedom of the press has always been associated with the ability of news journalists 
to do their job free from interference from government (Muhlmann 2010). Clearly this 
is crucial for independent news production and a healthy public sphere. Self-regulation 
has become the sacred mantra associated with the freedom of the press ‒ the only means 
to ensure governments can’t interfere in, dictate the terms and thwart the practice of 
journalism. But this denies the influence and power of a corporate culture that wreaks its 
own havoc and sets its own agenda often far more blatantly than any democratic govern-
ment would ever dare. If you are relatively powerless (say a journalist in relation to an 
editor) then self-regulation can be meaningless, particularly when the person in power 
does not share your views. Most recently, with the threat of compulsory redundancies 
at the Independent newspaper, Michelle Stanistreet, General Secretary of the National 
Union of Journalists has commented that a workforce that is paid “bargain basement 
salaries […] is fearful and compliant” (Press Gazette, 2 August 2013).
But it is not only journalists whose freedom is circumscribed by corporate compli-
ance. Our ability to exercise our own democratic freedom as ordinary members of the 
public is premised on the basic fact that governments are not distorted by private interest 
of multi-media conglomerates. When governments as well as journalists are beholden to 
corporate power then freedom is hard to come by for all but the most powerful. 
Understanding the role of the news as an industry and news organizations as corpo-
rate entities in these relations is crucial to our understanding of how ‘freedom’ can be 
more easily claimed by some to the detriment of others. ‘Freedom of the press’ as an 
ethical practice does not somehow magically transcend the market it is part of. Far from 
it, rather, it has become embroiled in a particular political-economic system. This is a 
system that tells us that productivity is increased and innovation unleashed if the state 
stays out of the picture and lets businesses get on with it. Productivity in the market and 
hence news as a commodity takes precedence over the social and political concerns of 
news as a mechanism of democratic process. In other words, the less ‘interference’ in 
the form of regulation, the more liberalised the market, the better the outcome (Jessop 
2002). In neo-liberal democracies the power of the market is just as significant as the 
power of government. In the UK, there is certainly no rush to regulate for a healthy 
relationship between news media and democracy, yet there is plenty of urgency about 
the need to deregulate media for the benefit of the market.
The industry response to the hacking scandal in the UK largely conformed to this 
neo-liberal premise. Freedom of the press expressed purely as the need to get the state 
to butt out and give commercial practice free reign is about nothing more than enabling 
market dominance to take priority over all other concerns. Freedom of the press ex-
pressed in this way is not a precondition or even a consequence of democracy so much 
as a substitute for it. Freedom requires accountability otherwise those with the most 
power will be free to do as they please while the powerless are ignored or worse. The 
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journalistic ethics on offer in this rhetoric is not the coming together of journalists for 
the general promotion of journalism in the public good and for the public interest – as 
one may find in such organisations as Reporters Without Borders5. Rather, it is a post-
state capitalist logic (Boltanski 2011) that has become normative. 
In the context of the hacking debate the phrase ‘freedom of the press’, has become a 
term that has been emptied of its real meaning by becoming one of what Hardt and Negri 
(2009, p.120) call “false universals that characterise dominant modern rationality”. But 
the process of assigning meaning can never be total and will always reveal contradic-
tions. As such, the relationship between capitalism and democracy (or capitalism and 
political freedom) should not be taken for granted. One of the areas of media that has 
been invested with the power to expose these contradictions is the internet – and it is to 
these debates that we now turn.
Free at Last: Deliverance via the Internet?
Just as individuals cannot claim the right to freedom of expression in the same manner 
as media conglomerates, neither can the so-called freedom of individuals online fulfill 
the emancipatory claims made of them. Most recently the notion of media freedom has 
been applied to information pluralism on the internet and claimed as a democratic gain. 
In this debate access to the internet (both as a producer and a user) is fore-grounded as 
the means to communicative and democratic freedom. The Internet, we are told, not 
only delivers communicative abundance but also brings power to the individual ena-
bling them in Castells’ terms to engage in self mass-communication. This liberation of 
the self comes via a form of creative autonomy (Castells 2009: 136) unleashed online. 
Castells argues that a new form of communication has emerged “where self-generated 
messages created by individuals can reach global audiences” (pp. 58-71) giving rise to 
unprecedented levels of autonomy imbued with emancipatory possibilities.
Similarly, in Benkler’s (2006) analysis, the Internet has the potential to change the 
practice of democracy radically because of its participatory and interactive attributes. He 
argues that it allows all citizens to alter their relationship to the public sphere, become 
creators and primary subjects engaged in social production. In this sense the Internet is 
ascribed the powers of democratisation. This may be the result of the networked indi-
vidual (in other words the individuals expanded relations to others), but it is primarily 
the liberation of the individual over that of the group that is emphasized. 
So, in these formulations, autonomy and freedom unsurprisingly sit side by side and 
they also sit at the heart of the networked politics of new social movements. It is in 
these networked forms of radical politics that genuine emancipation and true political 
freedom is said to reside. It is worthwhile therefore, pausing to consider how freedom 
and autonomy are often construed in the most recent of new social movements such as 
Occupy. The conceptualization and enactment of autonomy in the networked sociality 
of contemporary radical politics has been forged through a connection to anarchism and 
autonomous Marxism. These approaches imagine the network as an ever-open space of 
politics. From this perspective, the network is not simply the expression of networked-
individuals, but the manifestation of self-constituted, un-hierarchical, and affinity based 
relationships. Much post-marxist theorizing has claimed that this heralds the emergence 
of a new (networked) subject of history that is non-hierarchical, with open communica-
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tion and self-generating information and identities that function via networks of activism 
and activists. Such networks are often staunchly anti-bureaucratic and anti-centralist, 
suspicious of large organized, formal and institutional politics. This is a form of politics 
that cannot be identified by a party name or definitive ideology and is often liable to 
rapid change in form, approach and mission. It is a politics that makes a virtue out of a 
solidarity built on the value of difference that goes beyond a simple respect for other-
ness and involves an inclusive politics of voice. Marchart (2007) has called this a type 
of ‘post-foundational politics’, while others have claimed that the space of new media 
enables a broader range of voices and types of material to be communicated to a wider 
audience without the constraints of needing to comply with or follow a particular po-
litical creed or direction other than the expression of an affinity with a particular cause 
The rejection of meta-narratives of political ideas in favour of autonomous political 
subjects and values is seen as being directly conducive to the pluralism of online medi-
ated spaces. The principle that no-one speaks for the collective, that each takes control 
of their own political activism as being allied to every individual’s ability to produce 
online. Thus, the Internet and the newly creative and autonomous political subjects it 
inspires is taken as evidence that radical politics can arise horizontally and take the form 
of networks, rather than hierarchical hegemonies as in a traditional politics of the Left.
There are of course, different ways of conceiving of autonomy. The type of autonomy 
expressed by post-Marxist discourse theorists that operates within a hegemonic frame 
(Laclau and Mouffe 1985) needs to be clearly distinguished from the post-hegemony 
autonomist theorists (Day 2005; Holloway 2002). The former stresses articulation and 
contingency and recognises that, although the singularity of multiple voices in pluralism 
must be recognised and respected, ultimately it is neither feasible nor necessarily desir-
able that each of these singularities occupies a permanently unified space, politics or 
language. In other words, while the singular authenticity of plural voices is constitutive 
of the whole and must be recognised as such, it is necessary, to transcend the particu-
larity of the singular to form a collective identity and ultimately, a counter hegemony.
Post-hegemony autonomist approaches, on the other hand, all too frequently overlook 
the critical contextual factors of state boundaries, prevalent political infrastructures and 
ever dominant economic constraints that raise critical questions regarding the political 
efficacy of new social movements and many contemporary forms of radical politics. 
Frequently, such approaches either disregard the impact of the politics of new social 
movements on a state polity or base the success of such movements on their ability to 
function external to a state polity and, as a consequence, they are not well placed to assess 
the nature and consequence of the political act in a broader context of political structures, 
leaving wide open the critical question: how open to contest and revision is politics today? 
Inequalities of power found in regimes of (mis)representation are both replicated and 
found in different manifestations online to lay challenge to the apparent limitless plural-
ity on offer via the Internet. Research on the digital divide notes that internet users are 
younger, more highly educated and richer than non-users, more likely to be men than 
women and more likely to live in cities (Norris 2001; Warschauer 2003; Shradie 2011). 
These concerns do not just refer to access to the Internet and the huge gaps prevalent 
between the global North and South; they also refer to online activity within developed 
nations and to traditional divides between the well educated middle class who dominate 
public discourse and those on the peripheries or excluded altogether (Hindman 2008). 
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Plurality, or at least the ability to take advantage of plurality, it would seem, is reserved 
for the privileged. 
Castells does contend that, with the expansion of the Web 2.0 project, the creative 
autonomy of subjects is constantly threatened by multimedia businesses, who seek to re-
commodify autonomous communication. But nonetheless, he continues to maintain that 
“…the construction of communicative autonomy is directly related to the development 
of social and political autonomy, a key factor in fostering social change” (p. 414). One 
will lead to the other. Castells (2009:300) argues that social movements that engage in 
oppositional politics – “the process aiming at political change (institutional change) in 
discontinuity with the logic embedded in political institutions” – now have the chance 
to enter the public space from multiple sources and bring about change. In his argument 
the multiple prospects for intervention and manipulation coming from a myriad of social 
nodes combine to create a new symbolic counter-force that can shift dominant forms of 
representation. The counter political response swells to such a size online that it simply 
cannot be ignored offline and is in turn, taken up by the mass media. By using both 
horizontal communication networks and mainstream media to convey their images and 
messages, they increase their chances of enacting social and political change – “even 
if they start from a subordinate position in institutional power, financial resources, or 
symbolic legitimacy” (Castells 2009: 302). 
Such accounts depend on an implicit assumption about the consequential relations 
between pluralism, networked communication and political demand. So the argument 
goes, technological ease of communication leads to abundance of information which is 
automatically a political gain. The Internet we are told, delivers beautiful and bounti-
ful information and political pluralism bringing forth the means to communicative and 
ultimately democratic freedom. 
But the sheer abundance of information available to us has also been argued to breed 
misinformation and lack of understanding (Patterson 2010) because the daily habits and 
rituals of news seeking have changed. People are no longer required to sit in front of 
the television for a set period of time each day or to read the newspaper over breakfast. 
Instead we do news snacking. But there are so many other more tempting treats on offer 
that ‘healthy’ news snacking is rapidly replaced by the more immediately gratifying tasty 
tit-bits of entertainment. Even more worryingly Patterson identifies a pattern whereby 
in a high choice media environment the less-well informed are more inclined to opt for 
entertainment while the better informed include the news junkies leading to increasing 
inequality of knowledge between the more informed and the less informed. Patterson 
(2010:20) also argues that speed “increases sensation but decreases learning” noting that 
about 60 per cent of those who regularly read a daily newspaper spend at least half an 
hour doing so compared to only 40 per cent of those who read an online daily newspaper.
The likes of Castells and Benkler’s argument actually has little basis in an account of 
people’s actual usage of the new media landscape. Understanding the daily habits and 
rituals associated with media use is crucial to analysing how the abstract possibilities 
of all technologies develop into everyday political culture. And if these accounts offer 
no analysis of actual media use, then they must also fail also to address the question of 
context. The experience of living in mediated worlds involves being part of the wider 
framings of social and political life, wider myths of social ‘order’ (Wrong 1994) spe-
cifically in relation to the particular types of framing of politics (and what lies beyond 
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politics) at particular historical moments. Once this is taken into account we can begin 
to surmise how neoliberal discourse maybe a powerful and largely successful attempt 
to reshape the framing of the political for a whole generation and remains powerfully in 
force in the individualistic values that saturate much life and action online. Bennett and 
Segerbergs (2013) work on social media and social movements is instructive here as it 
reveals how this heavily personalized means of communicating protest leads to connec-
tive rather than collective responses; a more individualized means of political agency.
Once we have taken account of the depth and breadth of contextual factors and situ-
ated them in a broader understanding of prevalent framings of meaning, then we must 
ask ourselves – has the networked communication of the internet integrated people 
better into public politics, made public politics administer against inequality and made 
centres of economic power politically accountable. I would argue, precisely the reverse 
in many countries with two or three decades of neoliberal politics and neoliberal culture 
which, arguably have eroded the integration of trust networks, increased inequality and 
increased the autonomy of corporations through deregulation and liberalization in a 
digital age where media usage is ever more surveilled, monitored and monetized.
Conclusion: The Problem of Politics and the Importance of Power
To thoroughly interrogate the relationship of media to democracy requires a considera-
tion of power – who has it and how is it used? To engage with a full consideration of 
power requires media scholars to embrace fully the social dimensions of mediated life 
and the political consequences of our actions and those of others. If we inject an analysis 
of power into the relationship between media and democracy then we are encouraged to 
take account of those who hold it and those who seek to claim it and then to critique how 
each is accountable to the other. The political cannot be understood outside of relations 
of power or without the social. It also requires us to avoid the assumptions and pitfalls 
of neo-liberal formulations of democratic life – discussed here in relation to particular 
interpretations of media freedom. 
In seeking to understand media and democracy in the digital age, we must also be 
prepared to take stock of this thing called democracy. Democratisation, whichever way 
you choose to see it, requires the real and material participation of the oppressed and 
excluded, of the victims of the political system. Democracy conceived of as access to 
communication and information can only ever take us to first base. It may well offer pos-
sible changes in the dynamics of action. It may even enable an expansion of the realm of 
the contestable and in this sense extend the public sphere. But acknowledging this should 
not give way to a fetishization of notions of plurality, autonomy and communicative or 
media freedom. Political participation is not just about access or voice, although both are 
crucially important. Ultimately, participation is about limiting the control of a few privi-
leged people or dominant corporations who rule. If participation is about sharing power, 
is it possible to share power at the level of the nation state, to reach a level of sovereignty 
by and for the people? In other words, we need to ask how do political systems work 
where representative democracy has gone askew? And then to question the role of the 
media therein and interrogate how the dynamics of political life and action are changing.
One simple yet terrifyingly complex goal would be to reconnect democracy with 
equality (social, economic, political, cultural and technological). This would serve the 
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critical purpose of immediately flushing out differential power relations and enabling 
a deeper understanding of what it means to give more control to more people. Recon-
necting democracy with equality premises the discussion on the sort of conditions that 
might be needed for us to come together as collectives to shape common action and to 
live together better and that includes the conditions of mediated practice. To consider 
who amongst us can lay claim to being a political actor and why and in what circum-
stances would we want to? It is these sorts of questions that address the organization of 
life by capital, and seek to re-establish the value of publics such that we can re-imagine 
democracy and its relationship to the media in a more substantive and radically progres-
sive way, that should be at the heart of our analyses as critical media scholars.
Notes
 1. The dominant section of the Press Industry campaigning against independent self-regulation put forward 
by Lord Justice Leveson after a year long public inquiry, sponsored the establishment of the Freedom of 
Speech Network that unsurprisingly, subsequently received handsome coverage in the mainstream press 
despite very little coverage of the hacking scandal itself throughout the length of the Leveson proceed-
ings (Bennett and Towned, 2012). The familiar retort of this press lobby is to compare those calling for 
improved self-regulation of the press overseen by a recognition body that will review the practices of 
press self regulation every 2-3 years in a manner recommended by Lord Justice Leveson to authoritarian 
states such as Zimbabwe. 
 2. Interestingly however, the UK newspaper industry has never once referred to the notable state subsidies 
to the press in the form of VAT exemption that total some £750m per year as state interference or censor-
ship.
 3. This Bill was proposed by Leveson as a means of offering statutory underpinning to a voluntary self-
regulatory framework. Because of the concerns over Press Freedom the Bill was then replaced with a 
Royal Charter. Royal Charters are archaic instruments of the Privy Council overseen by the Queen and 
ironically are far less democratic in nature that any legislative mechanism allows for.
 4. 20 Cabinet ministers met senior Murdoch executives 130 times in the first 14 months of office. See the 
full list on Number 10s website: http://www.number10.gov.uk/transparency/who-ministers-are-meeting/
 5. Reporters Without Borders claims to be “the largest press freedom organization in the world, with over 
120 correspondents across the globe.” (http://en.rsf.org/rsf-usa-23-11-2009,35024.html). It works to 
expose limits on press freedom and support journalists who are being persecuted.
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